Friday, August 15, 2014

Argentina and the vulture funds

When a friend of mine said last night at the dinner table that Argentina was bankrupt I first kept calm but then raised my voice in anger and explained to him that he echoed media propaganda. My wife was a bit upset that I became so angry.

This morning, in a quiet house, my wife still sleeps, I read interesting news about the continuing story of the fight between Argentina and the vulture funds:

Bonistas europeos apelan en Nueva York

Tenedores europeos de bonos argentinos pidieron ayer a la Corte de Apelaciones de Nueva York que suspenda una orden judicial que mantiene bloqueado un pago de Argentina a sus acreedores y les impide cobrar, en el marco del litigio de Buenos Aires con fondos especulativos.
En documentos presentados ante la Corte de Apelaciones del Segundo Circuito de Nueva York consultados por la AFP, el grupo de bonistas apeló la orden del juez neoyorquino Thomas Griesa del 6 de agosto.
En su decisión, Griesa había reiterado que el intento de pago de Argentina a sus acreedores por medio del Bank of New York Mellon (BoNY) "fue ilegal" y dijo al banco que debe retener los fondos, 539 millones de dólares, hasta nuevo aviso.
Los bonistas europeos son parte del 93% de acreedores de Argentina que aceptaron los canjes de bonos de 2005 y 2010, con quitas de hasta un 70% sobre el valor nominal de los títulos, y que venían cobrando los vencimientos de esa deuda hasta que Griesa ordenó congelar los fondos.
La medida de Griesa buscaba forzar al país suramericano a cumplir con su fallo a favor de los fondos especulativos NML Capital y Aurelius, que integran el restante 7% de acreedores que rechazó la reestructuración.
A pesar de la llegada del plazo de gracia del 30 de julio y negociaciones de último momento en Nueva York con la presencia del ministro de Economía Axel Kiciloff, Argentina tomó la decisión de no aceptar la exigencia del juez de pagar 1.330 millones de dólares a esos fondos a los que califica de "buitres" porque compraron la deuda en default.
La medida de Griesa buscaba forzar al país suramericano a cumplir con su fallo a favor de los fondos especulativos NML Capital y Aurelius, que integran el restante 7% de acreedores que rechazó la reestructuración.

Monday, August 11, 2014

De-growth conference Leipzig 2014

If you are interested in an alternative to the current capitalist growth model and would like to be inspired, you should follow the 2014 de-growth conference to be held in Leipzig from 2-6 September. I read the abstracts of conference papers and have decided to go to Leipzig and meet the authors.

Working with my wife on a book about world ports and the history and future of the world economic system and community, I hope to meet people in Leipzig who will inspire me.

You can find information about the Leipzig conference by clicking HERE.

To give you an idea of the papers to be discussed at the conference, I copy the abstract of one of them:

Contributors: Bourcarde, Kay, Dr. (Institut für Wachstumsstudien)

Ehrenamtlicher Vorsitzender des Instituts für Wachstumsstudien; Leiter des Referats für Beschäftigungspolitik und Fachkräftesicherung im Ministerium für Soziales, Arbeit, Gesundheit und Demografie RLP .
Scientific paper contribution: The misunderstanding of “Growing Growth”
The paper is co-authored by Dr. Karsten Herzmann

Abstract: The paper addresses a core assumption of economic policy, namely, the assumption growth by steady high rates being typical to economies. In the seventies such exponential growth has been criticized in the bestseller “The Limits to Growth” to be a hazard to the environment and to mankind as a whole. However, as the paper demonstrates, almost all western economies show mere linear growth. Hence, the continuous decrease of growth rates must not be considered an aberration from economic normality, which needs to be explained, but to be typical for modern economies. Since growth rates nevertheless are the most prominent indicator for the success of economic policy, politicians still are constantly urged to take “countermeasures”. A multitude of fundamental changes in economic and social policies may therefore to be revaluated: In contrary to the usual critique of being ineffective or unsocial the issue addressed here is that by such reformations politics tragically tries to improve the conditions for growth in order to “restore” a normality, which, empirically, has never existed.

A new G24 to change the world?

The office from which I work.
I am venturing a new initiative (to be carried out by others with, if needed, some help by me): would it be possible to bring together (via e-mail) a group of about 24 people, experts on urgent global issues and how to solve them, working in different places around the world, and discuss among them a plan of action to "change the world"?

There are many good ideas about urgent global issues and ways to solve them but so far they have not received the support from policymakers. So the question is how to get these good ideas implemented.

What I have in mind is that a group of experts visits parliaments in countries around the globe to inform parliamentarians about the way some urgent global issues could be resolved. Such visits should be accompanied by a media campaign.

Is this a viable initiative?

I think it needs the support of first-class, independent scholars from various countries around the globe and a few expert activists and organisers like myself.

If you are interested in the ventured initiative and have some thoughts of how it could be brought about and what its effects might be, I would encourage you to send me a note including if you would like to explain why it is not viable: jj.teunissen@fondad.org

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

Personal ethics do matter

Why are people in power positions in public or private institutions applying policies or engaging in actions that make other people suffer?

Is it because they believe what they are doing is correct (I hope that is the case of those working at ministries of finance, central banks and the military) or is it because they think it is permitted (I think that is the case of many of those working in the private sector)?

People working in the private sector commonly believe that any action is permitted that is 'legal' (as in the case of the vulture funds acting against Argentina or, earlier, during the Allende government, of the US copper companies Anaconda and Kennecott acting against Chile). But a better, or additional, criterion would be: anything is permitted that is ethical. Personal ethics do matter.

Saturday, August 2, 2014

The psychology and the politics of Argentina's debt case - with a reference to Orlando Letelier

Below is a different, more psychological explanation of what is happening in the conflict between the vulture funds and a US judge on the one hand, and the Argentinean government on the other. I agree that psychology is an important aspect of what is usually seen as 'hard' or tough economic and political thinking and acting. However, the case of Argentina's conflict with its enemies in the United States and elsewhere including Europe reminds me of what Orlando Letelier once told me. While Letelier, being Chile's ambassador in the US during most of the time of the Allende government (1970-73), agreed with the principle of excess profit being deducted from payment to US copper corporations being nationalised in Chile in 1970, he said he had recommended the Allende government to not apply this principle as it would give a 'legal' argument to the US government and other capitalists worldwide to oppose and isolate the Chilean government.

Orlando was right. With the help of law, the US copper companies contributed to giving a bad name to Chile in business and political circles. It looks as if the vulture funds are causing the same in the case of Argentina: hurting investor confidence and blocking international payments.

The fight between the Argentinean government and US and other capitalists is, in part, a fight between a sovereign government that does not abide to the capitalist law enforced by a US judge and those (the US and others) who want to make sure that no other government will follow the example of Argentina.

That lesson was echoed almost immediately by the new pro western government of Ukraine who declared a couple of days ago that it would always pay its debts and never follow the example of Argentina.

Here is the article I referred to in the first line of this post, which was published on 3 August 2014 by Perfil.com:

Publicado en edición impresa de Perfil 

Choque cultural


Resentimiento 2001. Quedó una herida abierta del primer default. | Foto: AP


Pocas veces se puede tener un ejemplo mejor de paradigmas en pugna: el argentino/napolitano versus el sajón/calvinista. A pesar de su apellido latino, el juez Griesa representó al de la estricta cultura calvinista que cree que “no hay cura sin dolor” (traducción interpretada de “no pain, no gain”). Y de la misma forma que Margaret Thatcher justificaba la Guerra de Malvinas diciendo que era una lección a los dictadores latinoamericanos, porque gracias a su intervención Argentina podía recuperar la democracia, los fondos buitre se mienten a sí mismos y a los demás diciendo que atacan la corrupción de los regímenes populistas latinoamericanos al demostrarles que “las reglas (en su caso más que las leyes, los contratos) son para cumplir” y hacen show persiguiendo las cuentas de las empresas de Lázaro Báez en Estados Unidos. El ala derechista del Partido Republicano en Estados Unidos, que tiene en el Tea Party su expresión más inflexible, se siente reconfortada con que Argentina sufra una condena severa por ser “un deudor recalcitrante” al que hacérselas pagar.
También en la Argentina se “malviniza” el juicio y el kirchnerismo descubrió que ese juez encorvado y bastante retrógrado, sumado al rostro desagradable y peores antecedentes del dueño del fondo Elliott, Paul Singer, le devolvían un enemigo que aglutinaba a la mayoría de los argentinos en su contra y permitía al Gobierno volver a crecer en aprobación, incluso hasta entre quienes aborrecen a Boudou. Lo que esperaba que hiciera el Mundial y no hizo, haciendo olvidar a los argentinos de la corrupción, lo logró el juez Griesa, con un fallo que resulta tan costoso cumplirlo como no hacerlo, y en ese dilema evidencia su error.
La comparación de Cristina Kirchner sobre los misiles que bombardean Gaza con los misiles financieros que recibe Argentina desde Wall Street ilustra la idea de guerra virtual que representa este conflicto en el que, como cuando la selección de fútbol enfrenta a Inglaterra, todo es metáfora del Sur contra el Norte.
La paradoja es que en esta guerra todos pierden, a la vez que todos creen que ganan. Porque mientras la derecha norteamericana piensa que afecta al kirchnerismo con esta lección, el Gobierno sale en el corto plazo políticamente favorecido. Y mientras el kirchnerismo gana aprobación en las encuestas, la Argentina pierde entre dos y tres puntos del PBI en los próximos doce meses.
Tres puntos del PBI cuestan diez veces más que pagar los 1.600 millones de dólares del fallo judicial. Movidos por esa lógica es que los mercados siempre imaginaron y apostaron a un arreglo. Pero el error de pronóstico surgió de creer que era sólo dinero lo que estaba en disputa. El ego, tanto el personal como el ideológico, estuvo presente en las decisiones del juez y del gobierno argentino. El choque cultural entre ambos –aunque pacífico– no tuvo nada que envidiarle al que Samuel Huntington desarrollaba en su teoría sobre el choque entre civilizaciones durante los años en que Bin Laden cosechaba seguidores entre quienes odiaban a Estados Unidos. Si el conflicto con los fondos buitre se hubiera desarrollado en la década del 70, no habría sido tan poco probable que un comando de Montoneros o del ERP hubiera asesinado a Paul Singer en Manhattan después de haber embargado la fragata Libertad. Gracias a Dios, vivimos en otra época, donde esas batallas quedan circunscriptas al terreno discursivo, por lo menos en nuestro país, pero las emociones tienen el mismo componente.
La forma como se estructuró la negociación sobre el cumplimiento de la sentencia parecía hecha a propósito para satisfacer el deseo conjunto de que no sea cumplida. Sólo los bancos que tienen muchos papeles de la deuda argentina promovían que se llegara a un acuerdo. Y como los pensamientos son hijos de los deseos, los pronósticos de los mercados siempre apostaron a que se alcanzaría un acuerdo, porque también era lo que más les convenía.
Un gran perdedor de estos dos meses fue la lógica económica. Quedó demostrado cuánto hay de irracional en el funcionamiento de los mercados y en la Justicia de la principal plaza financiera del mundo. Bancos expertos en especulación como el JP Morgan, sabiendo que la espada de Damocles del fallo de Griesa estaba a pocos meses de caer, casi se quedan doblemente perjudicados por sumar bonos de deuda argentina más parte de los bonos que Repsol recibió por el 51% de YPF, más seguros antidefault (CDS). Es la misma actitud de tapar el sol con la mano la que lleva a Kicillof a decir “no hay default” y la que llevó a los bancos a pronosticar en contra del default.
Timba, ingenuidad, voluntarismo, todo entre quienes se supone que son los más fríos y racionales tomadores de decisión. Otra demostración de emocionalidad atávica la evidenció el presidente de la UIA, Héctor Méndez, al responsabilizar de lo que sucedía a “una mujer y un joven”, por la Presidenta y el ministro de Economía, como si la condición femenina y la juventud (tampoco tanta en Kicillof) inhabilitaran el buen raciocinio. Méndez debió sentirse identificado etariamente con el juez Griesa, pero su problema no es haber envejecido mal, porque hace años que dice barbaridades.
Otro tipo de solidaridad generacional debe haber sentido Brito con Fábrega (difícil la vida del presidente de Banco Central) al proponer una negociación de compra del juicio a los buitres asumiendo que el Gobierno la aceptaría.
En síntesis –y parafraseando el título de tapa de ayer de PERFIL–, un default esquizofrénico, más que selectivo.

Friday, August 1, 2014

Argentina's struggle with the vulture funds

For those who read Spanish here some news on Argentina's struggle with the vulture funds. It was published on 2 August 2014 by Gaceta Mercantil. As you may know, US judge Thomas Griesa does not allow Argentina to pay its restructured debts without also paying the vulture funds. However, he made an exception to his ruling, as you can read below. 

 

Griesa autoriza el pago de bonos argentinos en Europa

El juez de Nueva York consideró por única vez que no podían ser incluidos en su sentencia a favor de los "fondos buitre".
01 de agosto del 2014r

El juez federal de Nueva York  Thomas Griesa completó este viernes una autorización para el pago de bonos argentinos reestructurados a través de dos agentes en Europa, tras considerar por única vez que no podían ser incluidos en su sentencia a favor de los fondos especulativos.
Griesa había fallado en ese sentido el pasado 28 de julio a favor del banco Citibank y ahora amplió su orden a los agentes de pago europeos Cleartream (con sede en Luxemburgo) y Euroclear (con sede en Bélgica), por los que transita el dinero en su camino a los bonistas en Europa.
La decisión no modifica el bloqueo que el juez mantiene sobre los 539 millones de dólares depositados por Argentina en el Bank of New York para abonar intereses de bonos reestructurados bajo legislación estadounidense en los canjes de 2005 y 2010, decisión judicial que colocó al país en situación de default parcial.
Citibank, Euroclear y Cleastream habían presentado una "moción de aclaración" en el litigio por la deuda soberana argentina sobre el pago de unos bonos en sus manos.
Tras analizar la cuestión, y a pesar del pedido de los fondos especulativos para frenar la transferencia, Griesa resolvió que por única vez Citibank podía efectuar ese pago que incluye bonos reestructurados en dólares bajo legislación nacional y otros emitidos como parte del acuerdo con Repsol por la estatización de la petrolera YPF.
Según la orden, el banco deberá distinguir a partir del 30 de julio entre los títulos reestructurados y los emitidos como parte del acuerdo con Repsol, algo que Citibank no podía hacer en esta ocasión por no disponer de tiempo suficiente.

A change of power in the global financial system?

Here is an interesting article about a possible change of power in the global financial system. It is written by Mark Weisbrot, who has authored recently interesting articles about Argentina's struggle with the vulture funds (see, for example, the previous post of 24 June 2014). It was published by Aljazeera America on 18 July 2014.


BRICS’ new financial institutions could undermine US-EU global dominance

The IMF and the World Bank could have real competition for the first time
July 18, 2014 9:00AM ET

During the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, when middle-income countries were hard hit by big capital outflows, there was an effort by China, Japan, Taiwan and other countries to put together an Asian Monetary Fund to offer balance of payments support. Washington vetoed the idea, insisting that all assistance had to go through the International Monetary Fund. The result was a mess, including an unnecessarily deep regional recession, as the IMF failed to act as a lender of last resort and then attached all kinds of harmful and unnecessary conditions to its lending.
But the world has changed a lot in the past 15 years. Last week the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) decided to form the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the New Development Bank (NDB), and the United States will not have a veto this time. These new institutions could mark a turning point for the international financial system.
Western media coverage of these developments has been mostly dismissive, but that primarily reflects the concerns of Washington and its allies. They have had unchallenged sway over the decision-making institutions of global financial governance for 70 years, and the last thing they want to see is competition. But competition is exactly what the world needs here.
The IMF and the World Bank were created in 1944, when the United States was pretty much the only standing industrial power in the world. The institutions mirrored that unipolar reality. Today Washington still controls both institutions, with the subordinate partnership of a handful of rich allies; the same is true for the G-7, G-8 and G-20. In recent years, as the eurozone has become the recipient of most IMF lending, the European directors have, of course, been given the predominant voice on policies in this region, but it’s still the same group of countries in charge. And even in the World Trade Organization, which was formed in 1995 and has a different consensual process, the founding rules were written by the rich countries — and in this case, especially their corporations.
Although most economists and most of the major media have ignored it, the IMF’s loss of influence over economic policy in most middle-income countries is one of the most important developments in the international financial system in the past half-century.
For decades there have been efforts to give the majority of the world’s nations a voice at the IMF and the World Bank, but progress has been glacial at best. The BRICS countries have more than 40 percent of the world’s population, and China is now the world’s largest economy, but they have almost no voice at either institution. To say that an alternative has been long overdue is an understatement.
The BRICS NDB has gotten the most attention, but the $100 billion currency reserve fund could prove a much bigger breakthrough. For most countries, one of the biggest constraints and sources of potential instability is the balance of payments. They must have enough dollars or other hard currency to finance imports and enough international reserves to insure against a panicked flight from their currency. Otherwise, their economies can fall into a crisis, a recession or other devastating economic imbalance. Most of the damage from the Asian financial crisis might have been prevented with timely balance of payments support.
But the harmful macroeconomic conditions attached to IMF lending have continued. Just look at Ukraine, where the economy is shrinking by 5 percent this year and the IMF is imposing austerity that will prolong and possibly deepen the recession. An examination of IMF policies during the global recession of 2009 showed that 31 of 41 countries with IMF agreements were subjected to pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies — that is, policies that could be expected to worsen an economic downturn or impede recovery. And although the IMF is only the junior partner in the troika, with the European Central Bank and European Commission, together they have dragged Europe through years of unnecessary recession and the collective punishment of mass unemployment, and that has hurt most of the global economy — including the BRICS and other developing countries.
The BRICS’ defection is part of a process that has been taking place over the past 15 years, in which middle-income countries have accumulated sufficient reserves to vote with their feet and break out of the IMF’s orbit. Although most economists and most of the major media have ignored it, the IMF’s loss of influence over economic policy in most middle-income countries is one of the most important developments in the international financial system in the past half-century. It has almost certainly contributed to the rebound of economic growth in most developing countries over the past decade. It is also, not coincidentally, a huge loss of influence for the U.S. government, which has traditionally used the IMF’s creditors’ cartel for its own imperial purposes.
The BRICS’ new CRA has the potential to break the pattern not only of U.S.-EU global dominance but also of the harmful conditions typically attached to balance of payments support. It could prove very important in the next few years: A lot of money has poured into emerging market government bonds since the Fed set short-term interest rates at zero more than five years ago. A lot of it could up and leave when the Fed decides to raise interest rates here. Such rate hikes were a major cause of the Mexican peso crisis in 1995 and hit other countries such as Brazil and Argentina a few years later. The BRICS countries have indicated that they are open to having other countries join. China has about $4 trillion in reserves, so it has the potential to contribute vastly more and probably still come out ahead, as most of its reserves will likely be losing money in U.S. Treasury bonds. There’s no telling how soon this new fund will be up and running or how big or inclusive it will grow to be. But the upside potential for the world economy is very big.

Mark Weisbrot is a co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C. He is also the president of Just Foreign Policy.