Sunday, October 27, 2013

The future of Europe

Drawing made by my daughter Belle after a photo of 1967 when young people in Europe were full of energy and optimism.
In July 2013, FONDAD organised a conference on the future of the euro and Europe at the Dutch central bank in Amsterdam (De Nederlandsche Bank) that was attended by officials and academics. It was a closed meeting of a small group of experts exchanging views.

In August, September and October I was six weeks in Latin America for a book my wife and I are writing on ports and the world economy and upon my return, after I had done some follow-up to that trip, I resumed my readings on internet about the current state of thinking and acting on the world financial system and the future of Europe.

A week ago I received from one of my friends of the FONDAD network, Avinash Persaud, an article to be published in the Financial Times, Bail-ins are no better than fool's gold. I circulated it among the participants of the July Conference at the Dutch central bank and a few others. That prompted reactions and I circulated more articles, the last one being a speech George Soros gave at a conference in Kiel on the future of Europe.

When I circulated these articles over the past week, I accompanied them by short letters. To share with you some of my thoughts on the world economic system and Europe I copy those letters below.

22 October 2013
Friends,
Below is a piece by Avinash Persaud, partly inspired by the FONDAD conference held at De Nederlandsche Bank in July.
After a quick reading my initial comment is that, in my view, financial crises are, first of all, a result of policy failure (rather than market failure), and that boom-bust cycles can be prevented by establishing a better international monetary and global financial system, and by good countercyclical policies.
I fully agree with Avi that we do not need bail-ins if we prevent systemic crises. In my view it is a shame that, say during the last decades, evitable systemic crises have not been prevented. Crisis prevention should have become a priority for policymakers. Policymakers should have listened to the warnings Bill White and Avinash and others made many years before the current crisis started in 2007. It is a shame they did not.
Yours,
Jan Joost

23 October 2013
For those of you who are not familiar with Bill White's analysis and warning of systemic crisis many years before it erupted in 2007, here is a piece that summarises Bill's role. I assume it is based on a long article that was published earlier by Der Spiegel. You may agree or disagree with the last para of the piece that follows (arguing that central bankers should step back and let the free market control financial activities). http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/economics/item/4442-william-white-of-the-bank-of-international-settlements-predicted-the-economic-crisis

27 October 2013
I recognise some of my own thinking in Soros' recent speech on the future of Europe (see below) and agree with him that Europe's creditor countries (including the Netherlands) are in a position to create a more hopeful and more efficient Europe.
In my view, Europe could become again an inspiring example for the world -- if it maintains its social ideals, its social system and creates more effective economic policies, for the sake of Europe and for the world at large.
Large companies are thinking and acting locally and globally, and people and governments in Europe and elsewhere should do that as well. It would be a shame if Europe drowned in its own impotence and self-created problems catering at nationalism and xenophobia.
I apologise for sending you during a week so many articles and bothering you with my own beliefs and intellectual and social anger, but I hope you will forgive me and take into account that I was in Latin America for six weeks (for a new book I am writing with my wife on ports and the world economy) and gradually updated myself by reading old and new news.
Have a nice Sunday,
Jan Joost

http://business.financialpost.com/2013/10/02/george-soros-the-euro-crisis-might-be-over-but-europes-nightmare-is-getting-worse/

28 October 2013
I hope the German and Dutch officials are going to move, but I doubt they will and I am almost sure that if they move they will do so insufficiently. The dogmas among the officials and the economic interests of the companies and better-off citizens (not only in Germany and Holland) are strong and the politicians and technocrats with other, wiser views are weak. Also, there is too little wisdom and too little pressure coming from academics; many of them sharing the same dogmatic ideas about proper economic policies and systems. I remember Robert Triffin once was saying to me, with a sad and lightly angry expression on his face, that most of his academic colleagues were whitewashing policies rather than criticising them and suggesting alternative policies. 
Yours, Jan Joost

Thursday, March 28, 2013

Dijsselbloem is right!

 

Jan Joost Teunissen

Just a few days ago, I was disappointed by Jeroen Dijsselbloem ... and now I am excited and would like to give him a compliment, even a great compliment!

He challenged the financial sector, telling them that from now on it would not be the taxpayer who would pay for the risks they have taken, but themselves and that the party - where profits were private and losses borne by the community - was over!

Naturally he received a lot of criticism for his surprising stance, both as leader of the Euro group and as Minister of Finance of the Netherlands. The criticism came, not surprisingly, from people who had set aside a lot of money in the Cypriot banks. And it came from politicians who said that, okay, he was right to finally tackle the financial sector, but he should have done this silently and not openly and publicly as it would stir emotions in the financial markets and among savers who would no longer trust that their money was safe in the banks. Thus it could prompt a widespread run on European banks when the next banking crisis emerged in another European country. And if that country were a large country, then the whole euro system might tumble. It would not be the first time that a chain reaction would damage the world financial system. This young and inexperienced Dutch minister of finance has behaved incompetently and irresponsibly. He should be replaced as soon as possible by someone more experienced who is familiar with financial markets and knows what one can say and do, and what one cannot say and do!


Since late Tuesday evening I have followed the harsh and emotional attacks on Dijsselbloem. What was actually the criticism? No more than that he had sown anxiety among people who work in the financial markets or among people who defend the markets through thick and thin. And, obviously, among savers who have put more than 100,000 euros in the Cypriot banks that are now being "cut up" or dissolved.

Dijsselbloem’s new policy is clear: "Shareholders, bondholders and big savers: from now on, you will have to contribute to the rescue or restructuring of a bankrupt bank."

Good, I think, finally there is the beginning of a change of policy vis-à-vis the financial sector! It's high time!

The only exception I would make is for people and companies in Cyprus that are "unreasonably" affected by the new policy of Dijsselbloem and his colleagues. If a business customer of a bank has all his money in a bankrupt bank, it seems unjust that he will lose an important part of the money that exceeds 100,000 euros. If I would still be in the position that Fondad would have over 100,000 euros on a business bank account and I would have established Fondad in Cyprus instead of the Netherlands, I would now protest and say that our work was made impossible if our bank was dissolved and we had lost a significant portion of our revenues.


For the rest, I have nothing but praise for the initiative by Dijsselbloem, and his openness about it. Without that openness, without the media echoing his words, the financial sector could have continued to lean backwards and let the taxpayer pay for its risks, revenues and losses.


I hope Dijsselbloem’s initiative will be the beginning of a democratization and socialization of the international financial system, in which governments and politicians take back the reins instead of, as they have done way too long, giving the financial sector free play. The current crisis in Cyprus, in Europe and in the rest of the world, gives good reasons for such democratization and socialization.

Friday, March 22, 2013

Cyprus, Dijsselbloem and the Need for Democracy


Jan Joost Teunissen


In the case of Cyprus, the error of Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister and head of the Eurogroup, as well as of his European colleagues, is that they forgot about democracy. You cannot abolish democracy, even though in the cases of Greece and Italy it appeared that you could replace democratic governments by technocratic governments. Also, Dijsselbloem and his colleagues underestimated the anger and the fear of savers like you and me, as well as the "investor sentiments" of the people operating in the financial markets.

Of course, in principle Dijsselbloem is in favour of democracy. But then he, and his colleagues, should have welcomed that in
Cyprus democracy - the parliament - has triumphed and not the technocracy.

More democracy in economic policy making in European countries is urgently needed, if only because its citizens are rapidly losing confidence in their leaders. Yes, they have chosen them, but not because they trusted their leaders to do a good job but because they had no alternative.

More democracy in economic decision-making and more protests of undignified citizens, are also urgently needed to remind policy makers that they should think better about how to address the crisis of Cyprus, and of the euro. And, last but not least: both the protests and the rethinking should help to change course!

Economic policymaking is too narrow-minded, as it is not embedded in a broader vision of what is at stake in society. Over the last decades, it has lacked that broader embedding and, instead, has left much of the thinking and acting to the players in the financial markets, especially the bankers. This has not only given way too much space to idiotic things that brought our economies to the brink of bankruptcy, but also led to recurrent crises in Latin America, in Asia, in Russia, until eventually the system was hit in its heart, that is, the U.S. and Europe.

One pretends that small countries such as
Greece, Portugal and Cyprus are the problem, but they are not. The problem is the capitalist system with the dollar as the key international currency and the unbridled financial markets with their agents operating in it to enrich at the expense of others. That is the problem.

Not the poor but the rich are the problem!

Not
Greece or Cyprus are the problem, but the United States and the maintenance of the dollar as the key currency of the system, are the problem! And let’s not forget that from the sixties onwards, sensible plans to reform the system have been proposed and even discussed by policymakers in endless meetings (eg in the early seventies by the so-called Committee of Twenty, a predecessor of the current G20). But no action was taken. Instead, an international monetary and financial system was maintained in which the United States and the U.S. dollar play a dominant role.

As we all know, economic policymaking is a matter of balancing political interests and choosing a policy that underpins political interests and keeps them intact - or changes them!

We also know that economic policies support a distribution of power between people and groups, or, to mention an old-day distinction that still applies: between labour and capital.

"The" economy is the result of human action and the power of people and groups who participate in it, and that is almost everyone. Consequently, economic policymaking is not "neutral" or "technical" as technocrats want us to believe, it is political.

What policy makers, politicians, entrepreneurs and journalists present as "sound" economic policies is equivalent to satisfying the needs of people working in the financial markets. In this way, economic decision-making has become dependent on "investor sentiments" and short-term horizons of the people who work in the financial markets.

It is not only the 'day traders' whose capricious behaviour they respect, but also those who make investments decisions for pension funds and other institutional investors.

By adopting "neoliberal" policies, governments have become the slaves of bankers and other powerful people in the financial sector. They have little impact on what is economically happening within countries and between countries. This explains their powerlessness to solve the euro crisis and other crises.

The financial markets not only have a too dominant role in the current world capitalist system, but they are also a major cause of the emergence and persistence of the crisis, both the international and the European crisis.

If one wants to address the crisis in
Europe and the global financial and economic crisis in a more serious way, one should begin by reforming capital markets rather than labour markets.

We need more, rather than less, democracy in economic policymaking. This applies both for individual countries and for the joint international approach to the euro crisis and the international crisis.

Dijsselbloem and his colleagues should welcome the fact that the parliamentarians in
Cyprus and the people who elected them, took action against technocratic decisions made by the Eurogroup and the government of Cyprus.

Without noise, resistance and protests, there is no democracy. Dijsselbloem, as a former parliamentarian, would or should agree with that.

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Flaws in the Austerity Debate - Remember Triffin

With a friend who belongs since long to the Fondad Network (John Williamson)  I had a discussion on the austerity debate (see, for an interesting article, "Paul DeGrauwe and the Rehn of Terror" by Paul Krugman).  

 In one of my letters I said:

"Following up on the austerity debate, I see a serious neglect of the world system aspect of the crisis in most analyses, in both the euro crisis and the international crisis. Rather than focusing on the way the crisis has emerged and developed, the debate focuses completely on the worrisome level of government debt, "inflexible" labour markets, and insufficiently regulated and supervised banks -- to name three features that experts, politicians and journalists discuss endlessly.

This framing and narrowing down of the discussion is fair enough if its purpose is to focus on certain aspects of the crisis. But it is not fair if its purpose is to prevent a broader and more fundamental analysis of and response to the crisis.

A second flaw in the debate about the (euro) crisis is that most experts, politicians and journalists reduce the debate to policies that they see as adequate responses to the crisis. So they present austerity as the solution to the government debt problem, "reform" of labour markets (i.e. reducing wages and making it easier to fire workers) as the solution to the problem (what exactly is the problem?) of inflexible labour markets, and better regulation and supervision as the answer to the problem of having to bail out banks.

I have long hoped for a more serious discussion of the crisis that would have departed from how the crisis emerged and developed in the international capitalist system. As you know, it started in some weak, sensitive parts of the system, spread to other parts of it, and ended up in creating, among other, the euro crisis. A serious analysis of the crisis would have suggested other responses than the current ones. Current policy responses are basically geared at crisis management instead of crisis resolution and crisis prevention.

I find it depressing and a shame that most analyses are superficial, flawed and misdirected. In such way it will be difficult, if not impossible, to resolve the crisis and prevent future crises. 

Finally, I think that we should analyse the crisis not only from an economic point of view but also from a political and (socio) psychological point of view. Otherwise, we will not come up with proper responses." 

The picture above is of Robert Triffin and me, taken during an interview I had with him in 1985 at his room at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve. I have written several articles about Triffin, when he was still alive and active, and after he passed away in 1993. In my bio as member of the board of the Triffin Foundation you can read a little bit of how important Triffin has been for me, and still is. 

Monday, March 4, 2013

The Irish example


The Swiss newspaper Le Temps of today summarised it nicely:

L’Irlande finit par assainir sa situation économique
L’ancien tigre celtique pourrait se passer du soutien européen fin 2013. La croissance reste cependant atone et le chômage massif.


“Ireland succeeds in curing its economy – The old Celtic Tiger will be able to do without European support at the end of 2013. However, growth remains sluggish and unemployment massive.”

For those of you who read Spanish, this article, written by Vicenç Navarro, may be interesting. It argues that Spain should not follow the Irish example.

Monday, August 6, 2012

Jens Weidmann

In 1986, when I was 38, I considered myself young, pragmatic and somewhat visionary and revolutionary. That year I created the international economic forum FONDAD to contribute to resolving the debt crisis of the eighties and preventing future crises. That same year Jens Weidmann was 19.

In the period 1987-2007, many economists around the world attended the conferences organized by FONDAD during those 20 years, including ministers of finance and central bank presidents.

Jens Weidmann is now 45 and is president of the German central bank. I doubt that he considers himself young and revolutionary. More likely, he sees himself as pragmatic and, perhaps, a bit visionary.

However, I do not think that Jens Weidmann is pragmatic, nor visionary, even though many who agree with him may think he is.

Thursday, October 27, 2011

Better Global Financial Governance – The Need for Reforming the System and Abandoning Free Market Ideology


Here is a talk that I gave at a Shadow G20 Workshop in Paris (29-30 October 2011)

Better Global Financial Governance – The Need for Reforming the System and Abandoning Free Market Ideology

Speech by Jan Joost Teunissen (founder and director of FONDAD) at the Shadow G20 Workshop in Paris, 29-30 October 2011 (Columbia Global Center, Reid Hall, Paris)

What kind of world are we living in?

If a psychologist would say, ‘You should think this, do that and accept what I tell you,’ a normal person would react by saying: ‘Hey, wait a minute, you cannot prescribe me how I should think or what I should do or accept.’ If a sociologist would do the same and prescribe how people in a society should think and behave, a normal person would say, ‘Sorry, you cannot prescribe us how we should think and behave.’ But, for some strange reason, when an economist does the same and prescribes how we should think and behave and what we should accept, it is felt as normal.

But this is not normal. Let me give another illustration of the absurdity of our world.

“If your unions are too strong and fight against lower wages and unemployment, or for healthy labour conditions, we will lower your credit rating thus forcing you to lower wages, increase unemployment and make labour conditions tougher.”

“If Greece has a problem in repaying its debt, we will increase the costs of repaying its loans.”

“If you refuse to privatise public companies or refuse to make it easier to lay off workers, we will not give you the loans we have promised you.” (said to Greece and Italy)

This is the world that is presented to us as “normal”. Why do people accept it as normal? Because they are told so, because they think it’s OK, because they are indoctrinated every day.

1. In this panel we discuss Global Financial Governance (GFG) and I suppose we have to give ideas of how it can be improved. But my immediate question is: Better GFG of what? Of the current international monetary and financial system? No, please not. I would prefer better GFG of a better system, because the current system has enormous problems and should have been reformed and fundamentally improved long ago. Why?

Let me give four reasons (there are more):

- First, because the current system has led, since the end of the 1960s, time and again, to financial crisis and economic instability, creating a lot of suffering for ordinary people.

- Second, because the system gives too much power and freedom to the financial sector.

- Third, because it creates credit and debt bubbles, as some experts realised already many years ago and now, with the crisis in the heart of the system, has become clear to everybody.

- Fourth, because the current system gives too much priority to finance instead of the real economy.

I would like to dwell briefly on the second point that there is far too much power in the financial sector. Every day you can hear in the news that governments are warned by the financial sector that they should do this or that, otherwise the financial sector, or the financial markets as they are usually called, will punish them with a lower credit rating and higher interest rates on loans. Governments seem to be powerless victims of a monster that they themselves have created when they decided in the early 1970s to let the private financial sector dominate international finance, and not reform the international monetary system as they had agreed in 2-year long negotiations (1972-74). And in the 1980s they deliberately deregulated the financial sector embracing fully the neoliberal agenda of deregulation, privatisation and free capital, an agenda faithfully advocated by mainstream economists.

Even though I think many people working in the financial sector have behaved and are still behaving irresponsibly, given the economic facilitating role that they ought to play – finance should be a means and not an end – and given the public responsibility of the financial sector, I blame first of all governments and mainstream economists for the mess we are in. Historically and politically, they are the ones responsible for it. They allowed the foreign financing of US deficits. They allowed the greed of bankers to have free play. They allowed the United States to finance its wars and have its military around the world including Europe, to defend Europe, with dollars lent by the rest of the world. They allowed global imbalances to emerge. They allowed the creation of a huge derivatives market of so-called innovative financial products that amounts to over 600 trillion dollars. And now these same governments feel powerless, or show they are powerless, against the vagaries, greed and profit-seeking of people switching huge anounts of money through international financial markets.

Yes, I’d like to stress it’s PEOPLE who are doing this. The neutral term “financial markets” is misleading. Financial markets are being talked about as if they are part of nature, as storms or rain showers that plague us and we are unable to protect ourselves against. But markets are managed and run by individuals, by so-called financial experts and economists. And their colleague economists working in the ministries of finance, in the central banks and other supervising bodies, and in the international financial institutions, let them largely do their tricks. They do not really limit the power of people operating in financial markets.

So this is not the global financial and monetary system that I would like to see governed or managed better by having, for example, a more powerful representation of emerging economies in international financial institutions (which I favour), or by making these same international financial institutions more powerful players in the global financial and economic arena. We need to reform the system! And we need to reform the dominant values, the ideology that maintains the system.

2. Even though over the last 4 years, after the crisis started in 2007, there has been much talk about the need to reform the system, and even though there have been many good technical and political proposals by individuals and groups coming together for this purpose, the effort of policymakers still seems to be largely to keep the current system going – with all its in-built problems and the certainty that it will lead to another crisis. Why do policymakers stick to the current system even though it has such serious problems and shortcomings?

Let me give you three reasons (but there are more):

- First, because policymakers are afraid of reforms that they do not know or are not sure about how they will function and what effects they will have. They rather prefer to stick to the routines they are familiar with.

- Second, policymakers are against reforms or are scared of reforms that do not have the agreement of mainstream economists and of people operating in the international financial markets.

- Third, policymakers have an interest in keeping the system basically as it is and only are prepared to make minor adaptations (which they themselves may see as major adaptations) to it. How they themselves would define this interest, I do not know. But I think they defend certain economic interests, certain political interests, and certain power relations that guarantee the continuation of these interests. I also think that policymakers see international financial markets as a key element of the system, and believe that governments and international financial institutions should intervene as little as possible in these markets, and only where it is really needed.

3. It is not the first time that the need for reform of the international monetary and financial system is being discussed and that sensible proposals to this effect have been made. Neither is it the first time that sensible proposals were not adopted, let alone implemented.

Efforts at reform of the system have been made on various occasions since the 1960s. The first efforts date back to the 1960s when dollar crises erupted because of US balance of payments deficits and the loss of confidence by other countries in the capacity of the United States to exchange dollars for gold. So there was a flight into gold and European currencies. These gold-dollar crises were “resolved” in 1971-73 by decoupling the dollar from gold and by moving from a system of fixed to flexible exchange rates. Then, in 1979, when there was another crisis of confidence in the value of the paper-dollar, it was “resolved” by a steep rise in US interest rates and by embracing neoliberal, monetarist policies. After that, in 1982, we had, primarily as a result of this steep rise in the US interest rate, the debt crisis of the 1980s in Latin America and a few other countries. Then, in the 1990s, we had several debt crises in emerging economies. During all these crises, wise men and women came together to suggest sensible reform proposals. Why have they had so little success in getting their proposals adopted and implemented?

I think partly because of the same three reasons I gave already: (1) policymakers are scared of reform, (2) policymakers are against reforms that meet the opposition of mainstream economists and people of the financial sector, and (3) policymakers have an interest in keeping the system as it is.

Let me elaborate on the last reason.

Policymakers want to keep the system as it is, not only because of sticking to certain economic policies and interests, but also because of sticking to certain political policies and interests. For example, in the 1970s and afterwards, NATO countries saw an interest in maintaining the US dollar as the key reserve currency of the system, as this would allow the US to finance with foreign-held dollars its military force for maintaining western dominance in the international political arena, and for military intervention.

Now, elaborating on the second reason, policymakers’ resistance to reform proposals that do not have the approval of mainstream economists and people of the financial sector, I see a serious problem with mainstream economists. They largely determine the terms of the “real”, or one could also say, the “false” debate. The problem of mainstream economists is that they have a biased and limited view of man & society, of how man and society should behave, and of what is “normal” or economically sensible behaviour. They presume, for instance, that normal behaviour should be driven by competition instead of cooperation and solidarity, and ruled by so-called free markets. I think we need a broader, social, political, ecological and philosophical view of man & society instead of the narrow view of mainstream economists.

There is yet another reason why reform proposals are not adopted, and that is that policymakers base their policies on limited and biased analysis of the crises, both of the crises of the past, and the crisis of today. A good example is the debt crisis of the 1980s in Latin America, in which the standard explanation was that developing countries had borrowed too much and western banks lent too much, while the alternative explanation stressed that the crisis was caused by a dollar-dominated global financial system that should have been reformed at least ten years earlier. I am one of those who presented in the mid-1980s the alternative explanation in an extensive article for the journal Alternatives that included long conversations with the famous economist Robert Triffin, who had advocated reform of the international monetary system since 1958.

4. What reform proposals of the system have been made over the last couple of years? Various reform agendas have been proposed, both by individuals and groups. Let me mention three group proposals that are relatively moderate, the one more than the other, but have not been adopted yet.

- The first is a report by a UN Commission, “Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System”, headed by Joseph Stiglitz and presented in March 2009.

Stiglitz highlighted its proposals in a short article (Guardian, 27 March 2009) as follows. ‘There are several important lessons from the crisis. One is that there is a need for better regulation. But reforms cannot be just cosmetic, and they have to go beyond the financial sector. Inadequate enforcement of competition laws has allowed banks to grow to be too big to fail. Inadequate corporate governance resulted in… excessive risk taking…’

The UN Commission recommended the establishment of a Global Economic Coordinating Council, to co-ordinate economic policy, to identify gaps in the global institutional arrangement, and propose solutions. ‘For instance,’ said Stiglitz, ‘there is a need for a Global Financial Regulatory Authority… There is a need for a Global Competition Authority… There is a need for a better way of handling defaults of countries…’

The other important recommendation by the UN Commission was the creation of a new global reserve system. ‘The existing system,’ said Stiglitz, ‘with the US dollar as reserve currency, is fraying. The dollar has been volatile. There are increasing worries about future inflationary risks. At the same time, putting so much money aside every year to protect countries against the risks of global instability creates a downward bias in aggregate demand weakening the global economy. Moreover, the system has the peculiar property that poor countries are lending trillions of dollars to the US, at essentially zero interest rate, while within their country there are so many needs to which the money could be put. A new Global Reserve System is "feasible, non-inflationary, and could be easily implemented".’

- A more recent set of proposals for Reform of the Global Reserve System – from an Asian perspective – was made in a June 2010 ADB report, edited by Jeffrey Sachs and others. Its contributing authors included Joseph Stiglitz, Charles Wyplosz and Wing Thye Woo among others.

In its Recommendations, the report states that the group sees the global reserve system evolving into a multi-currency reserve system, with Asia holding close to half of the world’s total reserves. At the regional level, the report recommends to increase regional economic integration and policy coordination in Asia. At the international level, it recommends to ‘strengthen prudential capital market regulations, given the obvious failure of the financial system to effectively police itself.’ It also recommends convening ‘a brain trust of independent international monetary experts as chronic current account imbalances and varying exchange rate regimes, for example, can cause unnecessary friction between countries.’

Haruhiko Kuroda, President of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), stressed in the preface to the report: ‘Asia is no longer a minor player. It must take a more active global role. (…) I sincerely hope that this report will stimulate constructive debate – both within and beyond Asia – on how we can move to a more stable, efficient and equitable global reserve system that will better facilitate global trade and capital flows.’

These ADB recommendations are not radical reform proposals. In the individual contributions, several authors advocated more radical reforms. For example, Stiglitz repeated his plea for a new global reserve system (like Triffin did before, for more than 30 years during the 1960s, 70s and 80s). ‘The choice facing the international community,’ he said, ‘is whether to create… a new global reserve system, or to “muddle through,” moving from the dollar-based system to a two- or three-currency reserve system, which could be even more unstable and volatile. This paper argues that a new global reserve system is absolutely essential, if we are to restore the global economy to sustained prosperity and stability.’

- A third report, “Reform of the International Monetary System” (the Palais Royal Initiative), published in February 2011, was prepared by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Michel Camdessus, Alexandre Lamfalussy and others.

Recently, on 4 October 2011, Camdessus presented its key messages at a Conference on Reform of the IMS organised by the Triffin Foundation of which Lamfalussy is the chair (I am one of its board members).

Camdessus started his presentation by conveying two convictions of the group: ‘first, that our collective failure in establishing over four decades a system deserving really this name has been one of the key factors of the crisis. No real system means no effective discipline, weak and uneven surveillance, and excesses of all kind: in current account imbalances, in indebtedness, in accumulation of reserves, in exceedingly volatile and destabilizing swings in capital flows, in exchange rates fluctuations with unjustified deviations from fundamentals... These are major misgivings, indeed.

From there, the conviction n° 2 that, as long as no credible responses are given to these problems, our increasingly integrated world economy becomes all the more vulnerable as it is simultaneously engaged in a process of transition toward a multicurrency regime.’

To face these risks, the Camdessus group proposed four avenues for reform: (1) better surveillance by the IMF, with ‘real transparency, teeth and fairness’; (2) strengthening of IMF instruments ‘in a world where financial developments overwhelm now the mere monetary and current exchange developments’; (3) a re-examination of the scope of the SDR to play a greater role in the system as a reserve asset; and (4) improving the governance of the IMF and its relations with regional organisations.

5. What can be done to get these three and other reform proposals adopted? How to influence policymakers? I know that the authors of the three reform reports mentioned are doing their best. There is a large role for journalists, politicians, students, intellectuals, unions, social movements, and for economists and other academics working within the institutions.

But let me go back to the provocative remarks at the beginning of my talk. The danger is that when unions and other people who go out demonstrating on the streets or occupying squares, lead to the lowering of credit rating, higher financing costs, loss of investor confidence and threats to governments that they will not receive promised loans, democracy is seriously undermined. You need countervailing views and values. And there is the other danger that is already manifesting itself, the danger that the current capitalist system, with its privileges for business and political elites, creates anger and frustration among people and stimulates xenophobic, nationalistic, anti-establishment, anti-intellectual movements and parties like we already have in the Netherlands.

So there is a task for all of us to demonstrate our concern, to defend democracy, particularly in the sphere of economic and financial decision-making that is too much dominated by the power of the financial sector and the opinion of mainstream economists. We can all contribute to creating a more democratic world, a world that no longer is dominated by financial markets and mainstream economists, a world in which economists broaden their view and look at the social, political and ecological aspects of society, talk to people, and listen to them.